Privacy-preserving smart meter control strategy including energy storage
  losses by Avula, Ramana R. et al.
Privacy-preserving smart meter control strategy
including energy storage losses
Ramana R. Avula, Tobias J. Oechtering and Daniel Ma˚nsson
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract—Privacy-preserving smart meter control strategies
proposed in the literature so far make some ideal assumptions
such as instantaneous control without delay, lossless energy
storage systems etc. In this paper, we present a one-step-ahead
predictive control strategy using Bayesian risk to measure and
control privacy leakage with an energy storage system. The
controller estimates energy state using a three-circuit energy
storage model to account for steady-state energy losses. With
numerical experiments, the controller is evaluated with real
household consumption data using a state-of-the-art adversarial
algorithm. Results show that the state estimation of the energy
storage system significantly affects the controller’s performance.
The results also show that the privacy leakage can be effectively
reduced using an energy storage system but at the expense of
energy loss.
Index Terms—Smart meter privacy, Bayesian hypothesis test-
ing, partially observable Markov decision process (PO-MDP),
energy storage losses, dynamic programming
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart grid (SG) is a next-generation energy network
with capabilities to improve grid reliability and efficiency of
power generation and distribution with smooth integration of
renewable energy sources. In this automated network, a smart
meter (SM) is a crucial component which measures the energy
consumption of the user and transmits the readings to the
utility provider at regular intervals of time. This raises privacy
concerns [1] since high-resolution readings can allow anyone
who has access to this data to infer about consumer’s behavior.
Since its introduction in [2], non-intrusive load monitoring
(NILM) techniques are known to be quite effective in disag-
gregating the smart meter readings and thereby detecting the
states of most of the general types of household appliances
[3]. A comparative study was done in [3], which shows that
the existing state of the art NILM algorithms are capable of
achieving detection accuracy up to 99% for certain appliance
types, which is quite concerning in the privacy context.
Addressing this issue, several privacy-preserving techniques
have been proposed in the literature, which are surveyed in [4],
[5]. Secure communication and cryptographic approaches [6]–
[8] may succeed in preventing the unauthorized third party
access, but they would fail to protect the consumer privacy
from a greedy authorized or compromised utility provider. A
promising physical layer privacy approach is load signature
moderation (LSM), where an energy storage system (ESS)
is used to moderate the consumer’s load profile in order to
hide appliances’ usage information. LSM using rechargeable
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Fig. 1: Schematic of the proposed smart metering system
where the energy management unit controls privacy leakage
to an adversary by using energy storage system with a model
describing its losses and one-step-ahead predictive control.
battery has previously been investigated in [9]–[14] to obtain
optimal control strategy under different privacy settings. How-
ever, all the works so far make some ideal assumptions such
as instantaneous control without delay, lossless ESS etc. These
idealized strategies may provide theoretic performance bounds
but the feasibility of such strategies in practical situations
must be further investigated. In this paper, we present a one-
step-ahead predictive control scheme modeled in a PO-MDP
framework using an ESS. Similar to [13], we use a privacy
metric based on Bayesian risk. The overview of the proposed
system is shown in Fig. 1. In this work, we restrict our analysis
to the electrochemical battery as an energy storage technology.
Nonetheless, the same approach can be followed for other
storage technologies by modeling them as their equivalent
electrical circuits [15]. For a battery system, we present a
model describing its losses in power conversion, losses due
to internal resistance and self-dissipation. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to consider the non-idealities
in ESSs in the context of smart meter privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present a model for ESS considering the steady state
energy losses. We also present the charge and discharge
bounds of ESS and also quantify the energy loss associated
with a discrete control action. In Section III, we present an
overview of the system along with the control strategy. In
Section IV, we evaluate the performance of the controller with
real household data using a state-of-the-art NILM algorithm.
Lastly, we conclude the paper in Section V.
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II. ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM MODEL
Since batteries stores the energy as chemical potential in
their electrodes, it can only be interfaced with a DC (Direct
Current) system. Hence, power converters are needed to inte-
grate the battery with an AC (Alternating Current) system. The
battery along with the power converters form the ESS. In this
work, we model the ESS using three simple electrical circuits
as shown in Fig. 2 to account for the steady state energy
losses. Even though several other processes of the ESS such
as capacity fade, increase in internal resistance, temperature
dependence etc., can also be considered, as a first step, we
restrict our focus to the steady state energy losses. In the
following, we present our analysis of the three-circuit model
in more detail.
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Fig. 2: Three-circuit energy storage system model
A. Losses due to self-dissipation
Self-dissipation occurs even if the ESS is not connected to
any load. Similar to [16], we model this phenomenon using
an RC circuit as shown in Fig. 2(a). The capacitor C holds
the charge content, Q of the battery and dissipates through a
parallel resistor R. In this circuit, the power converter and load
are together represented as a current source controlled by the
current flowing in the second circuit shown in Fig. 2(b). Given
the self-discharge rate γ and a constant current Ibat flowing into
the battery, the charge content of the battery is updated as
Qt+∆t = (1− γ) · Qt + β · Ibat (1)
where,
γ = 1− exp
(−∆T
RC
)
; β =
−γ∆T
log(1− γ) (2)
B. Losses due to internal resistance
Similar to [16], the losses that occur in battery during its
charging and discharging operations are modeled using a series
resistor r, as shown in Fig. 2(b). The open circuit voltage of
the battery, VOC is represented as a voltage source controlled
by the capacitor charge Q in the first circuit shown in Fig. 2(a).
For an input power of P from the power converter, the current
flowing into the battery is given as
Ibat =
√
V2OC + 4rP− VOC
2r
(3)
C. Losses due to power converters
As shown in Fig. 2(c), we model power converters as ele-
ments with a constant efficiency factor within their operating
region. For an input power of D from the load, the power at
the battery terminals can be written as
P = D · (ηc1{D ≥ 0}+ η−1d 1{D < 0})
= D · δ(D) (4)
where ηc, ηd are the efficiency factors of AC-DC and DC-AC
converters respectively and 1{A} is equal to 1 if A is true, and
0 otherwise. δ(D) is the common factor for both operations.
D. Three-circuit ESS model
Integrating the three circuits by combining (1), (3) and (4),
the controller updates the energy state of the battery evolving
over time using the equation given as
Zt+∆t = (1− γ)Zt + βVOC
2r
(√
V2OC + 4rDtδt − VOC
)
(5)
where γ, r are time-invariant parameters, β depends on the
time step ∆t and δt depends on the control variable Dt. By
limiting the battery current to Imax, from (3), we have the
control space limited as
Dmax =
1
4rηd
(
(VOC + 2rImax)2 − V2OC
)
(6)
Dmin =
ηc
4r
(
V2OC − (VOC − 2rImax)2
)
(7)
Due to the finite energy capacity of the battery Zmax, from
(5) we have the following constraints on Dt:
Dt,max =
V2OC
4rηd
(2r[Zmax − (1− γ)Zt]
βV2OC
+ 1
)2
− 1

(8)
Dt,min =
ηcV2OC
4r
([−(1− γ)2rZt
βV2OC
+ 1
]+)2
− 1
 (9)
where [x]+ is equal to x if x ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise. In
comparision to (5), the energy state of an ideal lossless battery
evolves over time as
Zt+∆t,ideal = Zt + Dt ·∆t (10)
Using (5) and (10), the energy loss associated with a discrete
control action can be given as
Eloss(Zt,Dt) = Zt + Dt ·∆t− Zt+∆t (11)
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND CONTROL STRATEGY
The proposed smart metering system uses an ESS for load
signature moderation. The ESS can be placed either in series
or in parallel configurations, in between the SM and house
as shown in Fig. 3. Both these configurations have been used
in the literature for SM privacy. Under ideal assumptions, the
two configurations are equivalent. However, considering the
energy losses, we have the following proposition.
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Fig. 3: Placement of ESS between smart meter and house.
Proposition 1. The average energy loss in the parallel con-
figuration is strictly less than that of series configuration.
Proof. Let X be the average energy demand by the house and
Y be the average energy request from the grid. Assuming that
the energy from the battery is not discharged back into the grid,
only (Y − X) flows through the ESS components in parallel
configuration, however, the total energy Y from the grid flows
through the ESS components in series configuration, leading
to higher energy losses.
In order to reduce the energy losses, we consider a system
with ESS in the parallel configuration as shown in Fig. 1.
The discrete time system is controlled for every time slot k
within a finite time horizon {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each time slot k is
of a fixed time duration T . Let e and q be the resolution of
energy and power measurements respectively. In the following
analysis, we use the capital letters to denote random variables,
their realizations by the lower-case letters and the range space
by calligraphic letters.
For each time slot k, Xk denotes the aggregate power drawn
by all the appliances in the house and is defined on X=
{0, q, 2q, . . . , xmax}. Zk defined on Z= {0, e, 2e, . . . , zmax}
denotes the energy available in the battery. The power drawn
by the ESS is denoted as Dk and it is the control variable
which is defined on D = {−dmin, . . . ,−q, 0, q, . . . , dmax},
where dmin and dmax are the maximum discharge and charge
power of the ESS respectively, given in (6) and (7). D∗k
defined on D denotes the desired battery power consumption
scheduled by the energy management unit (EMU). In the
presence of an ESS, the SM records the aggregate power
demands of consumer and ESS. In this work, we allow the
energy from the battery to be discharged to the grid resulting
in negative values of SM measurements. It is represented by
the random variable Yk = Xk + Dk which is defined on
Y = {−dmin, . . . ,−q, 0, q, . . . , xmax + dmax}. Hk defined
on H denotes the n-ary joint hypothesis of all the appliances
in the house and Hˆk defined on H denotes the hypothesis
detected by the adversary having access to the consumer’s
statistical and real-time data as well as the control strategy
employed by the EMU.
A. Bayesian risk
Similar to [13], we use detection-theoretic approach by for-
mulating the smart meter privacy problem into an adversarial
Bayesian hypothesis testing where an adversary having access
to the consumer’s statistical and real-time data tries to make a
guess on the hypothesis state using a decision strategy. In the
Bayesian formulation, each of the hypothesis test outcomes
is assigned a cost and the decision strategy that minimizes
the average decision-making cost will be employed by the
adversary [17]. The average cost or Bayesian risk function,
R, is given as
Rk =
∑
i,j∈H2
Ci,j · P (Hˆk = i | Hk = j) · P (Hk = j) (12)
where Ci,j is the cost of deciding Hˆk = i when Hk = j is
true. By setting the cost of a correct decision to zero and the
cost of an error to unity, the risk function gives the average
error probability of an adversarial detection strategy.
In this work, the accumulated minimum Bayesian risk
(AMBR) is chosen as a privacy metric, which is given as
AMBR =
N∑
k=1
R∗k (13)
where R∗k = min{Rk}. The AMBR is a good choice for
measuring privacy due to its operational meaning. It explicitly
characterizes the best possible detection performance achiev-
able by any adversary.
B. Control strategy
Ideally, the controller uses all the information available until
time k (denoted as Ik) to choose an action dk+1. However, as
described in [18], since Ik is increasing in dimension with k,
its sufficient statistic given by the posterior distribution of the
Markov chain Hk conditioned on Ik (denoted as pik) is used
instead of Ik to choose the action dk+1. For a given initial
battery state z0, this posterior distribution forms a information
state or belief state at time k, given as
pik(i) = P (Hk = i | Ik)
= P (Hk = i | pik−1, xk) (14)
where Ik = {z0, pi0, x1, y1, pi1, . . . , pik−1, xk}. The control
system is modeled as a PO-MDP controlled sensor, as shown
in Fig. 4, by making the following assumptions:
• The hypothesis of the house Hk evolves over time fol-
lowing a first-order Markov chain with a time-invariant
transition probability PHk|Hk−1 .
• The controller observes the Markov chain Hk only
through a noisy measurement Xk made with a time-
invariant observation probability PXk|Hk .
• The control signal D∗k is generated by the controller using
time-dependent control strategy PYk|Xk−1,Zk−1,Πk−1 .
House Noisy sensor
Controller
+ Smart meter
Dk
Hk Xk Yk
Controlled sensor
Fig. 4: EMU modelled as a PO-MDP controlled sensor.
Given the initial energy state, z0, the controller estimates the
state of ESS at any time k using the equation
zk = f(zk−1, dk) (15)
where dk = yk − xk and f is a deterministic function of
ESS model given by (5). As described in [17], the minimum
Bayesian risk function based on our assumptions is given as
R∗k(pik−1, zk−1, µk) =
∑
y∈Y
min
hˆ∈H
{ ∑
g,h,x∈H2×X
C(hˆ, h)·
PYk|Xk−1,Zk−1(y | x, z) · PXk−1|Hk−1(x | g)·
PHk|Hk−1(h | g) · PHk−1(g)
}
For the finite time horizon, the optimal control strategy is the
solution to the nonlinear optimization problem with objective
function given as
µ∗ = argmax
{µ1,··· ,µN}
N∑
k=1
R∗k(pik−1, zk−1, µk) (16)
subject to the constraints given as
PYk|Zk−1(yk | zk−1) = 0 if

yk < dk,min
or
yk > dk,max + xmax
The belief state space (denoted as Π) is a |H| − 1 di-
mensional unit simplex. Solving this optimization problem
requires discretization of Π in order to get a finite set. The
optimization variable in (16) is of dimension N × |Y| × |X |
and solving it in its original form is computationally complex
as the dimensionality of the the problem increases with N .
This can be formulated into a recursive dynamic programming
problem as given in the following proposition, the proof of
which follows from [18].
Proposition 2. For the finite horizon PO-MDP with model
given in Section III, the optimal control strategy µ∗ = {µ∗1, µ∗2,
. . . , µ∗N} is the solution to the following backward recursion:
Initialize VN (pi, z) and then for k = N − 1, . . . , 1 iterate
Lk(pik−1, zk−1, µk) = R∗k(pik−1, zk−1, µ) +∑
xk,yk∈X×Y
Vk+1(pik, zk) · P (xk, yk)
Vk(pik−1, zk−1) = max
µk
{
Lk(pik−1, zk−1, µk)
}
δ∗k(pik−1, zk−1) = argmax
µk
{
Lk(pik−1, zk−1, µk)
}
With the designed optimal strategy µ∗, a real-time PO-MDP
controller is implemented as shown in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Realtime PO-MDP controller
Initialisation: pi0, z0
1: for k = 1 to N do
Pre-process :
2: Choose action y∗k = µ
∗
k(pik−1, zk−1)
ESS control :
3: if (y∗k < xk + dk,min) then
4: Limit yk = xk + dk,min
5: else if (y∗k > xk + dk,max) then
6: Limit yk = xk + dk,max
7: else
8: Allow yk = y∗k
9: end if
Post-process :
10: Update the belief state pik = T (pik−1, xk)
11: Update the ESS state zk = f(zk−1, yk − xk)
12: end for
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The simulation experiments to validate our control scheme
are implemented in MATLAB using real household con-
sumption data from ECO reference dataset [19]. The control
strategy is obtained by solving the optimization problem using
the nonlinear programming solver based on interior point
algorithm [20]. We simulate a scenario where the controller is
tasked to protect the events of a water kettle every day between
8 AM and 9 AM. The controller chooses an action every
minute by observing the real-time appliance consumption data.
For this objective, a 12V 100Ah lithium-ion battery is selected,
which can sufficiently satisfy the power requirements of the
kettle. To simplify the problem, we assume a fixed VOC equal
to the nominal battery voltage. The parameters used in the
simulation are listed in Table I. The Markov chain probabilities
of the PO-MDP control model are estimated from 30 days of
labeled training data and listed in the Table II.
A. Visualization of control actions
With this setup, the control actions for different initial states
of the battery are simulated and are shown in Fig. 5. Due to
the measurement quantization, switching events are noticed as
peaks in the smart meter measurements as shown in Fig. 6.
These residual peaks are informative to an adversary operating
with high precision measurements. However, the cardinality of
the state space increases with measurement precision, which
increases the dimensionality of the optimization problem by
O(n2). Fig. 7 shows the evolution of the state of charge (SOC)
of the battery due to control actions. It is interesting to notice
that without any design objective on the battery state, the
control scheme is steering the battery towards the full charge
state. This result in the degradation of controller’s performance
which is discussed in the following.
TABLE I: Simulation parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Max. appliance power demand xmax (W) 1700
Time slot duration T (s) 60
Time horizon length N 60
Power measurement resolution q (W) 500
Energy measurement resolution e (Wh) 5
Battery nominal voltage Vnom (V) 12
Battery capacity Qmax (Ah) 100
Max. allowed battery charging current Imax (A) 80
Max. allowed battery discharging current Imin (A) 80
Battery internal resistance r (Ω) 0.006
Battery self-discharge rate γ (%/month) 3
Power converter efficiency ηc, ηd (%) 95
Cardinality of X |X | 4
Cardinality of Y |Y| 8
Cardinality of Z |Z| 241
Cardinality of H |H| 2
Cardinality of Π |Π| 11
Max. allowed battery input power Dmax +2q
Min. allowed battery input power Dmin -2q
ESS model parameter β 0.017
TABLE II: PO-MDP control parameters
Parameter Value
Ci,j
[
0 1
1 0
]
pi0
[
0.95 0.05
]T
P (Hk|Hk−1)
[
0.98 0.34
0.02 0.65
]
P (Xk|Hk)
[
1 0 0 0
0 0.17 0.14 0.17
]T
B. Evaluation of controller’s performance
To evaluate the performance of the controller, we simulate
an adversary using NILM algorithm. In particular, we simu-
lated Weiss’ algorithm [21] which extracts switching events
from the aggregate smart meter data and assigns each event to
the appliance with the best match in a signature database. This
algorithm is implemented using NILM toolbox developed by
[19]. We use 30 days of labeled training data to create the
signature database. Weiss algorithm utilizes three-dimensional
consumption data (i.e., real, reactive, and distortion powers)
in order to match an event signature. We tested its detection
performance by injecting the controlled battery current in-
phase to the supply voltage resulting in corrupted real power
measurements. The accuracy of the adversarial detection is
measured using F-score, which is given as
F-score =
1
1 + (FN + FP)/(2TP)
(17)
where FN, FP and TP denote false negative, false postive and
true positive respectively. The F-score lies between 0 and 1,
where F-score = 0 indicates no detection and F-score = 1
indicates complete detection.
The Weiss’s algorithm is simulated under different test
conditions using 30 days of validation data and the obtained
average F-scores, energy losses and the AMBR are listed in Ta-
ble III. It can be seen from the results that the AMBR and the
F-score are correlated. The test case without a battery resulted
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Fig. 5: Control actions of battery.
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in the highest F-score. While using a battery, the controller
is able to reduce the F-score significantly. However, it can be
observed that the ability of the controller to preserve privacy
depends on the initial state of the battery. For this simulation
setup, the controller performed better when initialized with
a battery of 25%-50% SOC compared to full charge. This
indicates that if the battery state is steered towards 25%-50%
SOC by the end of the control time horizon, it would result
in better performance for the next control horizon. However,
this improved performance is achieved at the cost of increased
energy loss.
TABLE III: Evaluation of controller against NILM algorithm
with different initial battery states
Initial battery SOC (%) F-score Energy loss (Wh) AMBR
0 0.1333 40.421 152.57
25 0.0357 36.217 153.51
50 0.0357 36.230 153.51
75 0.2667 26.770 153.50
90 0.4833 14.174 153.49
100 0.6333 9.779 148.89
Without battery 0.7931 0 0
C. ESS model comparision
For the simulated battery, Fig. 8 shows the difference
between the % change in the state of charge of the battery
estimated by three-circuit model and an ideal lossless model
for different input powers. The model difference is particularly
significant at high power levels. Due to very low γ for
electrochemical batteries, the difference in state estimation is
negligible when comparing three-circuit models with and with-
out considering self-dissipation. However, for energy storage
systems with high self-dissipation rate such as flywheels, the
self-dissipation phenomenon cannot be neglected.
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Fig. 8: Comparision of ESS models at 50% SOC.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a privacy-preserving control
scheme based on Bayesian risk and a three-circuit model
to estimate the energy loss associated with a control action.
The controller is modeled as a PO-MDP controlled sensor
to maximize the Bayesian risk function of an adversarial
hypothesis testing and the resulting nonlinear optimization ob-
jective is solved in a backward recursion. Extensive numerical
experiments were carried out to evaluate the performance of
the controller thoroughly. Especially, we tested the controller’s
performance against a state-of-the-art NILM algorithm using
real energy consumption data. We investigated the effect of
the initial state of the energy storage system on the controller’s
performance. An important conclusion from this work is that
the privacy leakage can be reduced by using an energy storage
system but at the expense of energy loss. Without an accurate
model, the error in state estimation propagates and if not
corrected, leads to suboptimal privacy control.
Future work will focus on the trade-off between the privacy
and energy loss, time dependency of the model parameters
as well as control strategy and including more energy storage
technologies.
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